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COMPARATIVE BANKRUPTCY
CULTURES: RESCUE OR LIQUIDATION?




Prior to the recent recession in the United Kingdom from
about 1989 to 1992, the last great period of insolvency in Eng-
land was the last quarter of the nineteenth century. At that
time, there were no specific rescue provisions in English law;
the emphasis in insolvency proceedings was very much on
liquidation. As far as statutory provisions were concerned, this
emphasis remained pretty much the same for about 100 years,
until the end of 1986.
During those 100 years, the statutory provisions-and for
the most part the judge-made caselaw-embodied a liquidation
culture. When a business failed, the normal outcome was as-
sumed to be a break-up of the business and a forced sale of the
assets. Sometimes the management had moved the business
and assets, either properly or improperly, prior to liquidation;
although the move might have rescued the business and the
jobs, the remaining insolvent entity was liquidated.
It seems to have been the peculiar position in the United
Kingdom, unlike in Europe and the United States, that liqui-
dators tended to be accountants and not lawyers. Those few
accountants who specialised as liquidators were feared as "un-
dertakers," and were not generally held in high esteem.
During this period there were no insolvency procedures
specifically designed to effect a rescue. There were, however,
statutory and judge-made procedures which-though they were
not, strictly speaking, insolvency procedures-could operate as
such and could effect the rescue of a distressed business, or
could, at least, effect a better outcome for the business or as-
sets than could a liquidation. It is worth looking at the origins
* Queen's Counsel. Leading Counsel specialising in insolvency law in Eng-
land and the British Commonwealth, of 3/4 South Square, Gray's Inn, London,
WC1R 5HP, England.
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of these remedies because they survive to this day, albeit with
statutory and caselaw improvements.
II. SECTION 425 SCHEMES
The companies legislation has for a long time contained a
provision which appears in the latest consolidated legislation
as section 425 of the Companies Act 1985.' The provision ap-
plies whether or not the corporation is insolvent or is likely to
become insolvent; it consists of a statutory facility to enable
the shareholders or creditors to reorganise or restructure the
company, or to compromise on debts and other claims so as to
enable the corporation or a successor to continue trading.
When used in an insolvency context, this remedy has some
parallels with a Chapter 11 reorganisation under U.S. law.'
A "scheme" under section 425 has never, by itself, operated
as a satisfactory substitute for insolvency proceedings; it has
always had a number of serious defects. The main problem is
that the commencement of section 425 proceedings does not
create a statutory stay on creditors' remedies. Thus, unless one
faced one of those rare cases where such protection was nei-
ther necessary nor desirable, a section 425 proposal was al-
ways vulnerable to attack by dissident creditors prior to the
scheme's confirmation by the court.
Section 425 also has less fundamental drawbacks. From
the start, the proceedings involve applications to court, which
have to be carefully prepared by lawyers; therefore, consider-
able expense is involved. Depending on the numbers of share-
holders and creditors, the summoning of the appropriate class
meetings can also be expensive. The confirmation hearing itself
can be contested and can, therefore, involve considerable delay
and expense. Section 425 could never operate in a case where
there was a need for an urgent rescue, unless the scheme had
been set up and confirmed in advance as a stand-by scheme.
Since section 425 proceedings are not insolvency proceed-
ings, there are no statutory powers of investigation or of com-
pelling turnover, and no specific statutory provisions to attack
preferences or undervalue transactions. Fraudulent conveyance
provisions can, however, be applied before, during, or after the
1. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 425 (Eng.).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
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section 425 proceedings. Further, in many situations, prefer-
ences and undervalue transactions, especially with insiders or
connected persons, can be attacked pursuant to corporate law
provisions of statute and caselaw,
A. Receivers Appointed Out-of-Court3
During the second half of the nineteenth century, and in
particular during the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
lenders' lawyers and the courts developed a special secured
creditors' remedy which has spread throughout the British
Commonwealth but has not passed into U.S. practice. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, it transpired that much
of the value in the new limited liability corporation lay in the
goodwill and trading, and not simply in the underlying assets.
Thus, lenders who wanted a security interest in the corpora-
tion often wanted security in the whole enterprise, and wanted
it run and realised for their benefit so as to recover as much as
possible of the amount loaned. As a result, security interests
were deemed to attach to a trading corporation's entire busi-
ness, including all its assets and goodwill. Under a literal in-
terpretation, the business would have been paralysed, because
no item of stock or manufacture could be sold without the
specific consent of the security holder. Accordingly, as a way of
helping lenders and trading corporations, the judges came to
interpret this type of security interest as a "floating" interest.
This type of interest allowed the corporation to trade the as-
sets subject to a security interest in the ordinary way, but on
enforcement of the security interest gave priority to the securi-
ty holder over unsecured creditors.' The security was held to
float and to enable the corporation to dispose of its assets in
the ordinary course without the specific consent of the security
holder until a given event, for example, until the corporation
was liquidated or until a receiver was appointed over its as-
sets. In such an event, the floating charge was held to
crystallise5 into a regular "fixed" security interest over the
assets still owned by the corporation.
3. See generally GAVIN LIGHTMAN & GABRIEL Moss, THE LAW OF RECEIVERS
OF COMPANIES (2d ed. 1994).
4. See id. 1-02.
5. See id. J 3-23.
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With the recognition of the "floating" charge, the role of
the receiver, whether appointed by the court in proceedings
begun by the floating security holder' or under contractual
powers in the security agreement, came to involve running the
whole enterprise. This was sometimes with a view to a rescue,
but more often it was to better realise the security interest by
selling the business (and incidental preservation of jobs) rather
than by liquidating the assets. One key factor was the
receiver's wide powers of trading as contrasted with a
liquidator's narrow power to trade only for the purpose of
winding up the corporation.
Initially, most appointments were made by the court in
proceedings started by the security holder, but gradually, and
nowadays typically, the appointment came to be made outside
of court by the floating security holder.
There was much complaining by commentators and judges
about the way in which "floating" security allowed the security
holder to "have his cake and eat it too." The company had
freedom to trade, yet the lender had security over all the as-
sets, with the ability to squeeze out ordinary trade creditors
when the corporation got into financial difficulties. Another
aggrieved party was the government, whose preferential but
unsecured claims were also initially shut out, at least until the
procedure was changed by legislation.7 One result of creating
priority for preferential payments over floating security has
been the ever-increasing use of fixed security in addition to
general floating security. To the extent that effective fixed
security is obtained, the preferential creditors do not get priori-
ty. Nowadays, the typical "debenture" security document con-
tains a rich "cocktail" of fixed and floating security, thus tying
up all the business and assets. The receiver is usually given
power to trade assets that are the subject of both fixed and
floating security.
For present purposes, the main point about floating charg-
es and out-of-court appointed receivers is that, without any
6. Floating securities holders are generally referred to as "debenture-holders"
as a result of the habit of securing the issue of debentures (loan notes) with float-
ing charges over the corporation's entire undertaking and assets.
7. See Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897, 60 & 61
Vict., ch. 19, §§ 2-3 (Eng.); see also Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act,
1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 62 (Eng.).
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formal insolvency proceeding, this type of secured creditor's
remedy in practice operated like a rescue procedure in many
cases, during the 100 years or so prior to 1987. Although it
was only in a few cases that corporations were entirely saved,
businesses, and many jobs, were often saved by means of a
sale as a going concern rather than a break-up and liquidation.
Although regarded by specialists as a success, receivership
of this type did have important limitations. Since the typical
receivership was non-court-related and non-statutory, and was
not really an insolvency procedure at all, the receiver's princi-
pal duty was furtherance of the secured creditor's interests.
His duties towards ordinary unsecured, non-preferential, credi-
tors were, and remain, very few indeed.8 He has been able to
concentrate on getting the secured creditor repaid, even if that
has meant an early sale9 and bad news for jobs or for the un-
secured creditors. Another weakness of receivership is that it
has never had the protection of a statutory stay. Prior to 1987,
this omission was awkward in cases of what may be termed
"utility blackmail." That is, when a receiver was appointed, the
utilities which were owed pre-receivership debts could try to
pressure the receiver by threatening to cut off the corporation's
supplies unless pre-receivership debts were met.' °
Another problem with receivership was that since it was
not an insolvency proceeding and did not bring about a statuto-
ry stay, unsecured creditors could not, generally speaking, be
prevented from getting a winding-up order from the court."
Although such an order did not strip the receiver of his power
to carry on the business, it made it much more difficult. For
example, a winding-up order meant that the receiver was no
longer an agent of the corporation, as he normally was under
the security agreement. Thus, he had to operate as a principal,
8. See Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corp., 1993 App. Cas. 295
(P.C. 1992) (appeal taken from N.Z.). This approach is analysed critically in
LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 3, 7-13.
9. See Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd. v. Gill, [19801 2 Lloyd's Rep. 51, 53-54
(Eng. CJA. 1979).
10. See, e.g., Wellworth Cash & Carry (North Shields) Ltd. v. North E. Elec.
Bd., [1986] 2 British Co. L. Cas. (CCH) 99,265 (Ch.).
11. There were a few exceptions. For instance, a petition seeking a winding-up
order could be adjourned to allow receivers to finish trading. See Re Northern
Developments (June 16, 1976) (Templeman, J.) (unreported decision, on file with
author).
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thereby losing certain immunities given to agents by English
law.
The biggest problem, however, was that in many cases
there was no floating charge covering the whole, or substan-
tially the whole, of the corporation's assets, and therefore no
receiver could be appointed to run the business with a view to
a rescue or a better realisation than in a liquidation. For ex-
ample, major corporations quoted on the London Stock Ex-
change did not typically give floating security, since such secu-
rity would have had an adverse effect on their credit ratings or
credit standing with suppliers and lenders.
B. The Cork Committee Report12
In 1977, back in the days of the last Labour Party govern-
ment in the United Kingdom, a specialist review committee
(Cork Committee) was set up to review insolvency law and
practice. It was chaired by one of the leading "undertakers" of
the day, Sir Kenneth Cork. The Cork Committee included
leading insolvency lawyers; it made a thorough survey of insol-
vency law and took evidence from a wide range of corporations
and other business organisations. However, by the time the
Cork Committee Report was published in 1982, Margaret
Thatcher was in power as Prime Minister under a Conserva-
tive government, and many of the suggested reforms no longer
fit in with the new political outlook. Nevertheless, the new
government accepted the need for reform in several major
areas, and some of those bore on the question of rescue. The
Cork Committee Report is thus regarded as the commence-
ment of the current "rescue culture."
One of the most important points made by the Cork Com-
mittee was that the appointment of out-of-court receivers pur-
suant to floating security, over the previous 100 years or so,
had been an important way of preserving businesses and jobs,
and had been superior to liquidation in creating realisations. 3
As a result, the Cork Committee recommended a new form of
insolvency proceeding which could be used whenever such
receivers were not or could not be used, so that every corpora-
12. REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 1982,
Cmnd. 8558 [hereinafter CORK COMMITTEE REPORT].
13. Id. para. 495, at 117.
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tion would have a similar opportunity of rescue or better
realisations.'4
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE REFORMS
In order to understand the reforms initiated as a result of
those Cork Committee recommendations accepted by the gov-
ernment, it will be necessary to emphasise one or two impor-
tant differences between the approach to insolvency in England
and that in the United States. The focus in the Cork Commit-
tee Report, and in English law generally, has been to rescue
the business and the jobs, but not necessarily the corporation
itself. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the same corporate entity
emerges at the end of a successful reorganisation plan, where-
as it is only in a small number of English cases that the corpo-
ration itself survives. In England, most rescues of businesses
have involved the sale of the business to other entities, while
the insolvent rump of the corporation has, generally speaking,
gone into liquidation.
Another important difference between English and U.S.
law is that in the United States, a Chapter 11 reorganisation
usually leaves the management in control as a debtor-in-pos-
session, 5 while in England, the former management of an
insolvent company is not usually allowed to remain in control.
The general view is that even where there is a likely rescue of
the corporation or the business, a licensed "insolvency practi-
tioner" should take over.
From an English point of view, the judiciary in the United
States tends to be pro-debtor. This pro-debtor stance may be
based on the idea that the United States is a pioneering soci-
ety where the entrepreneurs take the risks and are too often
oppressed by the banks and financiers. In England, judges
tend to favour the financiers; bankers appear to have acquired
respectability over the centuries whereas those who take risks
in business have not. English judges also tend to be sympa-
thetic towards insolvency practitioners as opposed to debtors;
14. Id. paras. 495-521, at 117-122.
15. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chap-
ter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1044 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis,
A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financial-
ly Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INTVL L.J. 267, 305 (1994).
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the licensed insolvency practitioners tend to be professionals
known to the court, whereas the debtor's descent into insolven-
cy tends to be treated as a ground for suspicion. Further, insol-
vency practitioners act either in the interests of a secured
financier or at the direction of the court.
One example of judges' favourable view of financiers has
already been given above: the recognition of the floating securi-
ty interest can be seen as a special favour for financiers.16 A
great number of loans to corporations other than those listed
on the London Stock Exchange are still in the form of loans
secured by a floating charge over all or substantially all of the
corporation's assets.
The fact that judges recognise the effectiveness of "agency"
with respect to receivers appointed out-of-court can be seen as
another favour to financiers. Security agreements have been
recognised as creating a very peculiar and yet very real agen-
cy. 7 The security agreement invariably provides that any re-
ceiver appointed by the security holder is to be the agent of the
debtor corporation, which will alone be responsible for the
receiver's actions. However, the corporation cannot fire this
agent; the appointment is irrevocable because it is part of the
security mechanism. On the other hand, courts have treated
the agency as being real, that is, they have applied agency
immunity to receivers.18 Thus, if a receiver as agent causes
the corporation to breach a contract, the courts have given the
receiver the usual agency immunity from a suit for wrongful
interference with contract, 9 except where proprietary inter-
ests are involved. This practice has proved to be an extremely
useful weapon in rescuing businesses.
The agency mechanism has also been held by the courts to
have other useful functions. The receiver is not personally
liable for rent because he is not a party to any lease.2" He is
not personally liable for property taxes because the corporation
is the occupant.2' Additionally, although a receiver (in con-
16. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
17. See Rhodes v. Allied Dunbar Pension Servs. Ltd., [1989] 1 W.L.R. 800,
807H (Eng. C.A. 1988).
18. See Welsh Dev. Agency v Export Fin. Co., 1992 British Co. Cas. (CCH)
270, 290F (C.A. 1991).
19. See id.
20. See cases cited in LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 3, para. 15-14.
21. See Ratford v. Northavon Dist. Council, 1987 Q.B. 357, 371E-72B (Eng.
122 [Vol. XMII:
INSOLVENCY IN ENGLAND
trast to a liquidator) has no power to disclaim unprofitable
contracts, the courts have held that a receiver, as agent of the
corporation, can effectively cause the corporation to repudiate
an unprofitable contract, leaving the other party a useless or
much less valuable right to claim damages as an unsecured
creditor. Hence, notwithstanding his agency for the corpora-
tion, the receiver may exercise the superior rights of his ap-
pointor, based on the appointor's security interest.22
As pointed out above, the potential weakness in an other-
wise rosy picture is that an aggrieved unsecured creditor can
present a petition to wind-up the corporation; if a winding-up
order is made, that order will automatically revoke the agency
of the receiver, and with it, may also revoke some of the impor-
tant protections that he has while he is trading.
Another difficulty arising from the lack of a statutory stay
is that in the last twenty years or so, it has become increasing-
ly common in England for vendors of chattel to adopt the Euro-
pean habit of placing retention of title clauses into contracts of
sale. The receiver of a manufacturing business may well find
that much, and possibly all, of his stock at the corporation's
factory is claimed by vendors as their property. He has no de-
fence to this claim, unless he can find a legal argument in
relation to the wording of the clause or its incorporation into
the contract.
IV. THE RESCUE CULTURE REFORMS
A. Administration Orders
The legislation engendered by the Cork Committee's re-
form proposals came into force, with some exceptions, at the
beginning of 1987Y The single most important reform was
designed to fill the gap left by those cases where receivership
pursuant to a floating charge over all or substantially the
whole of the company's property was not possible, or where the
security holder was not willing to appoint such a receiver.24
C.A. 1986).
22. See Airlines Airspares Ltd. v. Handley Page Ltd., 1970 Ch. 193 (1969),
explained in Astor Chem. Ltd. v. Synthetic Tech. Ltd., 1990 British Co. Cas.
(CCH) 97, 104C-H (Ch. 1989).
23. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 (Eng.).
24. For example, the lender who is adequately secured by real property does
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On the basis of the Cork Committee's recommendations, the
legislation created a statutory and court-controlled version of
such a receivership called an "adniinistration order."25 Rather
confusingly, the type of receiver discussed above is called an
"administrative receiver."
The administrator under an administration order is ap-
pointed by the court. The filing of a petition seeking an admin-
istration order and the order itself create a mandatory stat-
utory stay, subject to exceptions agreed upon by the adminis-
trator or the court.26 The administrator is an agent of the cor-
poration, and has all the powers that would be given to a re-
ceiver appointed under a floating security.' In order to have
an administrator appointed, the corporation or its creditor
must show that the'corporation is insolvent or likely to become
insolvent and that the administration order is likely to achieve
one of the four types of statutory goals set out in section 8 of
the Insolvency Act 1986. One possible statutory goal is the
survival of the corporation and its business;28 other possible
goals are protection of a section 425 scheme,.or new, simpler
forms of reorganisation known as Corporate Voluntary Ar-
rangements 29 (CVAs). Neither a section 425 scheme nor a
CVA would have the protection of a statutory stay themselves.
The final and most often-used statutory goal is a better
realisation of the assets of the corporation than would be
achieved in a liquidation; in fact, administration orders will
almost always result in a better realisation than in a liquida-
tion.3" In the case of pure holding corporations with no em-
ployees, and no ongoing business, there can be special prob-
lems in falling within the statutory criteria.
The major limitation on administration orders arises from
the very reason for their introduction. Administration orders
were meant to plug a gap when administrative receivers could
not need to enforce his security over the business as a whole, and may not wish
to do so in an effort to avoid poor public relations, in particular with future bor-
rowers.
25. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 8 (Eng.).
26. See id. §§ 10-11.
27. See id. § 14.
28. See id. § 8(3)(a).
29. See infra Part IV.B.
30. For example, a compulsory winding-up by the court automatically fires all
employees whereas an administration order does not.
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not or would not be appointed; thus, the ability and willingness
of a floating security holder to appoint will effectively veto any
application for an administration order,"' unless the secured
creditor's security would be avoided in administration pursu-
ant to the statutory avoidance provisions.32 This would be the
case, for example, if the security would amount to a voidable
preference or an undervalue transaction."3
The introduction of administration orders came just in
time for the last great recession. The stock of some corpora-
tions listed on the London Stock Exchange fell during the re-
cession, and the administration order procedure was available
in situations where it might not previously have been. Well-
known examples include British & Commonwealth Holdings
plc, 4 a substantial conglomerate; Maxwell Communications
Corporation plc,35 the public corporation flagship of the late
Robert Maxwell; and the Olympia & York corporation. 6 In
fact, none of these may have collapsed because of the recession
itself, or at least not solely because of the recession. Neverthe-
less, these corporations are good examples of cases where an
appointment of an administrative receiver was not possible or
not desirable, yet liquidation would probably have been disas-
trous for creditors. Administration orders were made in each
case, leading to CVAs or section 425 schemes and a much
better outcome for creditors and jobs.
Although administrators are, in many ways, analogous to
administrative receivers, the legislation gives them one or two
additional special powers which are used in rescues and better
realisations. For example, in that rare type of rescue where
both the corporation and the business were preserved, a receiv-
er had no power to change the directors of the corporation in
order to satisfy a purchaser or investor of the stock of the cor-
poration. Administrators, on the other hand, have a special
31. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 9(1).
32. See id. § 9(3).
33. See id. § 9(3)(b)(i).
34. Re British & Commonwealth Holdings plc (Nos. 1 & 2), 1992 Ch. 342
(C.A. 1991); Re British & Commonwealth Holdings plc (No. 3), [1992] 1 W.L.R.
672 (Ch. 1991).
35. Re Maxwell Communications Corp. (No. 2), [19941 1 All E.R. 737 (Ch.
1993).
36. Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd. v. Adamson (Re Olympia & York
Canary Wharf Ltd.), 1993 British Co. Cas. (CCH) 154 (Ch. 1992).
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statutory power to remove directors. 7 Further, in retention-
of-title cases, administrators have the benefit of a mandatory
statutory stay that extends to retention-of-title claimants.38 In
fact, the statutory stay protecting administration orders has
been interpreted widely enough to prevent an airport seizing
aircraft as security for landing charges39 and to prevent land-
lords exercising self-help remedies to re-enter premises and
terminate a lease.40 An administrative receiver would not
have had such protections.
B. Corporate Voluntary Arrangements
The other main innovation in the context of rescue was the
introduction of CVAs. A CVA, as opposed to a section 425
scheme, is a much simplified form of restructuring or
reorganisation. First, no application to court is necessary if the
creditors pass the CVA by the requisite majority.4' A court
challenge is possible within a relatively short period,42 but
otherwise the CVA takes effect. The statutory provisions pro-
tect the interests of secured creditors from being affected with-
out consent,4' but secured creditors could not be affected by a
section 425 scheme without their consent." There are no class
meetings in the case of CVAs, so that the whole procedure is
much cheaper and simpler. However, since a challenge can be
made on the grounds of unfair prejudice,45 CVAs are suitable
only for simpler cases, and are usually not suitable where
creditors are of very different types with very different inter-
ests. Nevertheless, CVAs have worked, particularly in conjunc-
tion with administration orders where the making of an ad-
ministration order has been needed to provide the statutory
stay. A notable example of the combination of the two was the
case of the English corporations in the Olympia & York col-
37. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 14(2)(a) (Eng.).
38. See id. §§ 10-11.
39. See Bristol Airport plc v. Powdrill, 1990 Ch. 744 (Eng. C.A. 1989).
40. See Exchange Travel Agency Ltd. v. Triton Property Trust plc, 1991 Brit-
ish Co. Cas. (CCH) 341 (Ch. 1990), explained in Olympia & York Canary Wharf
Ltd., 1993 British Co. Cas. (CCH) at 156.
41. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, §§ 3-5 (Eng.).
42. See id. § 6(3).
43. See id. § 4(3).
44. See Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 425(2) (Eng.).
45. See id. § 6(1)(a).
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lapse.46 Although the numbers were very large, there were
not too many distinct classes of creditors.
C. Administrative Receivers
The statutory reforms have also improved the situation of
administrative receivers; they have been given statutory pow-
ers of investigation similar to those possessed by liquidators
and administrators." They have also been given statutory
protection from utility blackmail, a protection also shared with
liquidators and administrators.4" Further, administrative
receivers have some limited statutory duties to give informa-
tion to unsecured creditors,49 but neither the legislation nor
the courts have imposed a general duty of care upon adminis-
trative receivers towards unsecured creditors.
V. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE REFORMING LEGISLATION
Unfortunately, the legislation appears to have largely
forgotten about the foreign element." Although there are
some new specific statutory provisions dealing with cross-fron-
tier cooperation of insolvency courts-which currently extends
only to some Commonwealth countries and colonies 5 -- there
appears to be a general failure to think through the existence
of a foreign element in a typical insolvency situation. Thus, for
example, the legislation is unclear as to whether the reforms
dealing with administrative receivership, administration or-
ders, and CVAs apply to foreign-registered corporations which
have a sufficient link with the English jurisdiction. Fortunate-
ly, the Courts have helped in this regard: one decision now
says that there can be an administrative receiver for a foreign-
registered company with a sufficient connection to the jurisdic-
tion.52 The position of administration orders and CVAs re-
46. Re Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd. (No. 3), 1993 British Co. Cas.
(CCH) 154 (Ch. 1992).
47. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 236(2) (Eng.).
48. See id. § 233.
49. See id. §§ 48(2), 49(2).
50. Recall the newspaper headline "FOG IN [ENGLISH] CHANNEL: CONTI-
NENT CUT OFF"-the classic example of English insularity and the country's
tendency to see things from only an English perspective. See William Grimes,
Chunnelvision, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
51. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 426 (Eng.).
52. See Re International Bulk Commodities Ltd., 1993 Ch. 77 (1992), a case
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mains unclear." It is hoped that the English courts will inter-
pret the legislation in a way similar to the way they have in-
terpreted matters concerning administrative receivers.
VI. POWERS AND IMMUNITIES AS AN AID TO RESCUE
The new legislation, effective from the beginning of 1987,
corrected some of the deficiencies in administrative receiver-
ship, which stemmed from the fact that administrative receiv-
ership was not a proper insolvency procedure. Not only are
administrative receivers, like liquidators and administrators,
now protected from utility blackmail, but they have new pow-
ers of discovery and turnover. They can apply to the court, in
the same way as liquidators and administrators do, to seek
discovery of documents and examination on oath of former
directors and others who might have information relating to
the affairs of the corporation.' Further, like liquidators and
administrators, administrative receivers can apply to the court
for an order for delivery of property, books or records of the
corporation.55 Recent caselaw has established that the court
hearing such a turnover application has jurisdiction to try and
determine questions of title, and that the provision is not re-
stricted to plain cases.56
The most important limitation on administrative receiver-
ship, and one which highlights the difference between it and
insolvency procedures, is the lack of a statutory stay. Thus,
receivers are still often vulnerable, in principle, to the attacks
of retention-of-title claimants. However, the courts have help-
fully accepted the notion that if the receiver has any arguable
defence, his personal undertaking to pay for goods that he uses
or disposes of will be accepted by the courts pending trial. This
policy is to prevent any immediate order for delivery of the
concerning discovery orders available to administrative receivers but not ordinary
receivers. Had it been held that the receivers appointed under floating security
over a foreign corporation were not administrative receivers, they would have had
to petition for a winding-up order and then persuade a liquidator to seek a discov-
ery order.
53. See Gabriel Moss, Administration Orders For Foreign Companies, 6 INSOL-
VENCY INTELLIGENCE 19 (1993); Gabriel Moss, Administration Orders For Foreign
Companies Revisited, 7 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 33 (1994).
54. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 236 (Eng.).
55. See id. § 234(2).
56. See Re London Iron & Steel Co., 1990 British Co. Cas. (CCH) 159 (Ch.).
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goods or any restriction on their use until there is a final rul-
ing on the claim.57
There is one important advantage which flows from the
lack of a statutory stay. Since, in theory, creditors' remedies
are not barred, the courts have not imposed upon receivers any
"expenses doctrine." To elucidate this point, a short explana-
tion of the "expenses principle" in liquidations is necessary.
Where there is a liquidation of a corporation, if property is
retained by a liquidator for the benefit of creditors generally,
then the courts usually order liquidators to pay debts and
taxes which arise from the retention of the property by the
liquidator. 8 This doctrine has been given a limited and highly
discretionary role in relation to administration orders where
there is a statutory stay.59 However, the courts have held that
no such principle applies to receivership, where there is no
statutory stay."0 Thus, not only is a receiver acting as agent
for the corporation not liable for expenses such as rent and
property taxes, but these cannot be claimed by creditors as an
"expense" of the receivership. This is very helpful for the suc-
cessful trading of the corporation in receivership, and is a defi-
nite boost to attempts to rescue the business. For example,
during the recession it proved extremely difficult to sell hotels
for sensible prices; a sale in any event might take a long time
and require a prolonged period of trading. The ability to avoid
the payment of property taxes on a hotel during the period of
receivership trading is a very important factor in trying to
keep the hotel business going. Achieving a similar result in
liquidation would have been impossible, and even in adminis-
tration might have been difficult.
Before the reforming legislation, receivers only had such
powers as were spelled out in the security agreement or were
implied by an antiquated property statute.6' Arguably, the
statutory powers were inadequate for the running of a modern
business. If a receiver found himself running a business with
57. See Lipe Ltd. v. Leyland DAF Ltd., 1993 British Co. Cas. (CC) 385
(CA).
58. For a detailed discussion of this principle, see Re Atlantic Computer Sys-
tems plc, 1992 Ch. 505 (C.A. 1990).
59. See id. at 527-28.
60. See id. at 526-527.
61. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 110(1) (Eng.), re-
pealed in part by Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, sched. 10 (Eng.).
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inadequate powers in the security agreement and inadequate
statutory powers, he could find himself in real difficulty. In
some cases, there were also awkward technical problems relat-
ing to the transfer of property by the receiver. All these prob-
lems were effectively solved by the Insolvency Act 1986, which
allows every conceivable power that a receiver could want to be
implied in the security agreement, unless it is expressly ex-
cluded.62 The statute gives administrators exactly the same
powers as administrative receivers and some additional ones.
Thus, no rescue should fail for lack of powers held by the ad-
ministrative receiver or administrator.
One feature common to both administrative receivership
and administration orders is the need to keep liquidation at
bay. The existence of an administration order automatically
prevents a winding-up order or a resolution by the stockhold-
ers from causing a voluntary liquidation." By contrast, the
existence of a receivership does not, in and of itself, bar liqui-
dation. However, administrative receivers do, at least, now
have an express power to defend a winding-up petition."
Although the caselaw is not completely clear or consistent,
it now appears that administrative receivers are not liable in
negligence to the corporation for damaging the interests of the
unsecured creditors.65 However, receivers do have an estab-
lished equitable duty to the corporation, although it is much
more limited than a general duty of care.66 Thus, the caselaw
establishes that when the receiver sells the business, he must
get the best price reasonably obtainable in the circumstances,
and that the unsecured creditors are protected to that ex-
tent." However, the caselaw also establishes that the receiver
is not bound to wait for a better price-for example if there is
a rising market-but may go ahead and sell.68 This may cause
severe prejudice to unsecured creditors.
62. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 42(1); see also id. sched. 1.
63. See id. § 11(1)(a).
64. See id. sched. 1, para. 21.
65. See Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corp., 1993 App. Cas. 295,
298G (P.C. 1992) (appeal taken from N.Z.). This approach is analysed critically in
LIGHTMAN & MOSS, supra note 3, paras. 7-13.
66. See Downsview Nominees Ltd., 1993 App. Cas. at 299B.
67. See id.




One possible solution is to bring administrative receiver-
ship and administration orders closer together. A further re-
form could give administrative receivership a statutory stay; in
exchange, administrative receivers would have a general duty
of care toward the corporation. Like administrators, adminis-
trative receivers could also be released from liability by the
court, as administrators are. 9 Such measures would improve
rescue procedures generally, although they might bring admin-
istrative receivers within some form of modified "expenses
principle." In some cases this might make rescues more diffi-
cult. Realistically, under the current political agenda, the
chances of sensible reforming legislation in this area are low,




The subject of the rescue culture and insolvency in relation
to banks was highlighted recently in relation to the collapse of
Barings, England's oldest merchant bank.7" Banks were origi-
nally excluded from the scope of administration orders. It is
fair to say that generally throughout the world, banks and
insurance companies are given special treatment in insolvency
because of the profound regulatory concerns that affect these
two industries. In the case of domestic banks, administration
orders were introduced subsequently, with special statutory
modifications to take into account the position of the regulator,
the Bank of England.7 Foreign-registered banks, however,
were not included in this move, probably as a result of the
assumption (which may well prove to be incorrect) that foreign-
registered corporations were generally excluded from adminis-
tration orders. Banks do not normally give floating security,
and therefore are unlikely to be the subject of administrative
receivership.
Administration orders have worked extremely well for
69. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 20(1)-(2) (Eng.).
70. See generally INSOLVENCY OF BANKS: MANAGING THE RISKS (Fidelis Oditah
ed., 1996); Laura Proctor, Note, The Barings Collapse: A Regulatory Failure, or a
Failure of Supervision?, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 735 (1997).
71. See Banks (Administration Proceedings) Order, S.I. 1989, No. 1276.
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banks, with the rescue of the Barings business being the most
prominent example. By contrast, since both the relevant corpo-
rate entities in relation to the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) were foreign registered, administration
orders could not be used. The same is true of the Iraqi foreign
trade bank, Rafidain Bank, which became insolvent as a result
of the United Nations sanctions imposed on Iraq. I shall deal
with the solution arrived at by practitioners and the courts in
relation to foreign banks when I discuss the other specially-
excluded category, insurance companies. There is, neverthe-
less, a much-needed reform to the effect that foreign banks
which have a sufficient connection with the jurisdiction should
be capable of having administration orders made for them in
England.
B. Insurance Companies
Insurance companies, whether domestic or foreign, were
initially, and still are excluded from the application of adminis-
tration orders, subject to one possible cross-frontier excep-
tion:72 it is theoretically possible, though rather unlikely in
practice, for a foreign insolvency court which has a special
statutory tie-up with England to make a request to the English
court pursuant to section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 for an
administration order to be made in respect of the corpora-
tion.73
More generally, around 1991, practitioners and the courts
were faced with a rising tide of insurance insolvency and the
inability to use the administration order procedure. The path-
finder case involved the KELM companies74 (later the
KWELM companies),75 a group whose affairs involved billions
of dollars. The directors of the corporations-three English-
registered, one Bermudian-presented a winding-up petition
against the corporation, with a view to holding the fort while
72. See infra Part VII.C.
73. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 426 (Eng.).
74. "RKELM" is a collective reference to Kingscroft Insurance Company, Ltd., El
Paso Insurance Company, Ltd., Lime Street Insurance Company, Ltd., and Mutual
Reinsurance Company, Ltd. See In re Kingscroft, 138 B.R. 121, 122 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1992).
75. Denoting the addition of Walbrook Insurance Company, Ltd. See Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 174 B.R. 884, 886 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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the directors put forward a section 425 scheme. The filing of a
petition gave rise to a discretionary stay, to be decided on a
case-by-case basis by the courts. Moreover, the directors suc-
ceeded in persuading the federal court in Florida that they
were the equivalent of debtors-in-possession, and should there-
fore be protected by a section 304 order under the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code with respect to pending proceedings in Florida.76
Certain creditors were dissatisfied with the way in which
the companies were being run; they wanted more control over
the proceedings and the shaping of the scheme. This led to a
successful application for the appointment of provisional liqui-
dators, thereby bringing about a statutory stay.7 Further-
more, the provisional liquidators were given exceptionally wide
powers, similar to those possessed by an administrator, to
manage the run-off and to take over the preparation of a sec-
tion 425 scheme. In the United States, the appointment of
provisional liquidators was followed by a sweeping general stay
throughout the United States pursuant to section 304.78 The
provisional liquidation later led to a successful section 425
scheme and continued protection under section 304."9
The precedent set by the KELM cases has been followed
throughout the recent wave of insurance insolvencies. There
has been one major exception, where the insurance company
went into liquidation in order to pursue statutory avoidance
remedies, with adverse results to creditors. In other cases, the
control and management by provisional liquidators with wide
powers, combined with the putting together of a section 425
scheme, has proved an extremely successful alternative to
liquidation. It is fair to say that businesses have not been
rescued in these cases, since the insurance companies were in
run-off; however, the run-offs have been conducted in a way far
more beneficial to creditors than a liquidation could possibly
have been.
The result of the use of provisional liquidation, as devel-
oped by practitioners and judges, is that we have something
similar to administration orders, but not tailor-made for that
purpose. The simple and obvious reform would be to extend
76. See In re Kingscroft, 138 B.R. at 124.
77. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 130(2) (Eng.).
78. See Hughes, 174 B.R. at 886.
79. See id. at 887.
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administration orders to insurance companies, with special
modifications to take account of the special position of the
regulator, the Department of Trade and Industry.0 As I have
pointed out above, this has already happened in relation to
English-registered banks.
The technique used in relation to insurance companies has
also been adapted for use in the case of foreign-registered
banks. In Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA.,"1
the provisional liquidators took upon themselves the role of
arguing for adjournment of the winding-up petition and seek-
ing to negotiate a deal with the stockholders so as to try to
rescue the bank. 2 That rescue attempt did not succeed, but
provisional liquidation of this imaginative sort at least created
a chance of a rescue.
While BCCI went into liquidation and never reopened its
doors, the ultimate fate of Rafidain Bank has not yet been
decided. There, provisional liquidators are in place and have
held the fort for some years. A liquidation would produce a
minimal dividend which would hardly be worth having. An
eventual end to the trade embargo on Iraq is likely to produce
payment in full of the billions of dollars worth of credit around
the world. The provisional liquidation has therefore functioned,
and continues to function, rather like administration, that is,
as a way of keeping the English branch of the bank afloat
pending the ultimate resolution of the sanctions issue. This
function is plainly in the interests of creditors and has general-
ly been welcomed by them.
C. Cross-frontier Rescues
In matters of personal insolvency, the old legislation re-
quired cooperation between insolvency courts throughout the
British Empire.' This legislation was useful when the Em-
pire covered a large part of the globe. Even then, however,
there was a major problem in that there was no equivalent
provision in relation to corporate insolvency. As a result of the
80. See Gabriel Moss, DTI Proposals for Non-life Insurance Companies: A Step
in the Wrong Direction?, 8 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 43 (1995).
81. 1992 British Co. Cas. (CCH) 83 (Ch. 1991).
82. See id. at 90F.
83. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 426 (Eng.).
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Cork Committee's recommendations,' it was decided to intro-
duce provisions which could lead to cross-frontier cooperation
between insolvency courts, not only throughout the United
Kingdom (which has three different legal systems, in England,
Scotland and Northern Ireland) but throughout parts of the
British Commonwealth and other former colonies which have a
similar system of law. 5 To some extent this has been
achieved under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Of
course, the Commonwealth and former colonies do not include
major trading partners such as the United States, Japan, and
the rest of the European Union.
With regard to the European Union as a whole, 1996 saw,
at long last, agreement on a European Insolvency Conven-
tion.86 However, the United Kingdom has so far succeeded in
holding up the Convention as part of the "Beef War" (i.e., the
"mad cow" disease controversy) hostilities with the rest of Eu-
rope. The draft Convention certainly has its shortcomings 7
for European cross-frontier rescues, but as people have pointed
out, it is probably better than having nothing.
With regard to cross-frontier rescue affecting countries
outside the scope of section 426, matters are largely left to the
good sense of the judges in the light of the prevailing caselaw.
The basic principles on which the English courts act are that
one court, usually the court of the place of incorporation,
should act as the court of the principal insolvency proceedings,
and that other courts should act in a way ancillary to the prin-
cipal proceedings. The ancillary nature of the other proceed-
ings, as far as England is concerned, involves giving directions
on the transmission of assets to the principal insolvency pro-
ceeding. While this is well-established in the caselaw relating
to liquidation, the caselaw dealing with rescue procedures is
not well developed. In one case, an English Commercial Court
judge refused to allow assets to be remitted to the United
States to join assets that were subject to a Chapter 11
84. See CORK COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 12, paras. 1911-12.
85. See PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser. Hansard) cols. 550-51 (July 18, 1985) (on
file with author); Hughes v. Hannover Ruckversicherungs-AtkiengeseUschaft (unre-
ported decision, C.A. Jan. 28, 1997) (LEXIS, UK Library, Engcas File).
86. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 1223.
87. Since we do not know whether the draft Convention will ever come into
effect in its present form, I have not gone into detail here.
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reorganisation." It must be noted, however, that in that case
there were no ancillary insolvency proceedings commenced in
England and-perhaps more importantly-the terms of the
proposed reorganisation were thought to be discriminatory
against European creditors.89 More helpful are recent dicta
saying that the English courts will do their best to assist U.S.
Chapter 11 proceedings. 9
The transmission of assets from an English ancillary insol-
vency proceeding is subject to the deduction of debts made
preferential under English legislation. It seems to be the case
generally that domestic conflict-of-laws principles in different
jurisdictions provide first for the payment of local preferential
creditors. Furthermore, transmission of assets to the principal
insolvency proceeding may also be complicated by the appli-
cation of local English mandatory set-off provisions. In a recent
first instance decision affecting BCCI, English liquidators were
directed to retain monies payable to world-wide creditors who
had claimed in the English liquidation and would have, as a
result of the application of English mandatory set-off rules,
received monies but who would not, under the law of the prin-
cipal insolvency proceedings in Luxembourg, have received
such payments.9' This decision is very much open to question,
although it may not have much effect on cross-frontier res-
cues.92 Certain dicta in the same case try to cast doubt on the
validity of the whole concept of ancillary insolvency proceed-
ings," but the court recognised that it was bound by caselaw
precedent to accept the existence of ancillary insolvency pro-
88. See Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. United States Lines Inc., [19891 1 Q.B.
360, 389 (1987).
89. See id. This view of Felixstowe has recently acquired the support of one of
England's top judges. See Lord Hoffnann, Cross-Border Insolvency: The 1996
Denning Lecture 14-17 (Apr. 18, 1996) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law) (transcript available from the Bar Association for Commerce, Fi-
nance and Industry, 60 Temple Chambers, Temple Avenue, London EC4Y OHP,
Eng.).
90. See Banque Indosuez S.L v. Ferromet Resources Inc., 1993 Butterworths
Co. L. Cas. 112, 1171 (Ch. 1992). This was Lord Hoffmann again-when he was
still a first instance judge.
91. In re Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l S.A. (No. 10), [1997] 2 W.L.R. 172
(Ch. 1996).
92. See Gabriel Moss & Nick Segal, Cross-Border Issues, in INSOLVENCY OF
BANKS: MANAGING THE RISKS, supra note 70, ch. 6, para. 6.13.




In my view, the road ahead should expand the cross-fron-
tier cooperation of insolvency courts, not only in relation to
liquidation procedures, but also in relation to cross-frontier
rescues. We already have the individual example of the Proto-
col in the Maxwell Communication Corporation case," where
the judges in charge of the Chapter 11 proceeding in the Unit-
ed States and administration order proceedings in England
approved a system for cooperation between the examiner and
the debtor-in-possession in the United States and the court-
appointed administrators in England. 6 It should be possible
to expand the principles behind this single case to a general
body of principles for cooperation between insolvency courts in
different countries generally. The prospect for the
harmonisation of substantive insolvency provisions, including
those relating to rescues, appears to be so remote that coopera-
tion between insolvency courts appears to be the way for-
ward. 7 It is, probably, the experience of most people in the
field that whilst there are many technical differences between
different systems of insolvency law, and even some fundamen-
tal differences in the approach to liquidation versus rescue as
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the rest
of Europe, insolvency courts are adept at cooperating despite
such problems. The example of the Maxwell Communication
Corporation case has shown that it is possible to bridge the
philosophical divide between the United Kingdom and the
United States, and this shows that cooperation between the in-
solvency courts of each system is entirely possible. Whether
larger philosophical gaps can be bridged remains to be seen,
but the task of making a start is as urgent as when Mark
Phillips and I first urged this route in 1992.98
94. See id. at 197.
95. Re Maxwell Communications Corp., [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1402 (Ch. 1993).
96. See id.; see also Hoffmann, supra note 89, at 18-20 (discussing this judicial
co-operation).
97. See Gabriel Moss & Mark Phillips, International Insolvency: Jurisdiction
and Co-operation, PRACTICAL L. FOR COMPANIES, Apr. 1992, at 6.
98. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The rescue culture is now here to stay. It has not only
permeated the legislation, but also the approach of practitio-
ners and judges. Sadly, the Insolvency Act 1986 is regarded as
one of worst-drafted statutes in U.K. legislative history. The
faults are many, but they do not cost money to put right, and
reform will help to save businesses and jobs. Thus, there is
some hope-for change in the near future.
